This Has to Change

Another week, another passive defensive showing from Liverpool, at least in the first half...

From the very first minute it was evident that when Brighton & Hove Albion looked to play out from deep, Liverpool would press – but not like the monsters we’ve come accustomed to. When Brighton built their play closer to the halfway line, Liverpool would become progressively more passive within the 4-2-4 OOP shape we’ve seen early doors from Arne Slots side.

As you can see from the image below, Brighton have a 6 vs 4 numbers game going. Igor is in possession but doesn’t have an obvious progressive passing option. That is, until our ‘Star-Boy’ Hinshelwood drops in-between Igor and van Hecke to add defensive solidity and simultaneously allow Igor to step up, whilst triggering Estupinan’s attacking run on the left wing.

Igor is in possession with time to wait on the next phase

Hinshelwood gets between the two centre backs to trigger Estupinan’s run

Liverpool’s passiveness creates two problems.

The first is that Igor can take time on the ball to choose and play his pass. This wouldn’t be an issue necessarily if he didn’t have a line-breaking option. Because he does, however, Ryan Gravenberch has a potential problem. Liverpool are not going man-for-man and so Danny Welbeck is able to drop and potentially be the next pass for Igor, allowing Estupinian to get as far up as possible.

With Estupinian’s momentum and the space being behind Gravenberch, the right pass could see Brighton have very lucrative pitch control.

Thankfully, the pass isn’t great and Gravenberch is alert and acts well to stop anything too dangerous from happening. We are however getting early signs that Brighton’s cohesive, confident and ballsy setup can at the very least get them territory in Liverpool’s half, and sustainably so.

To add confusion, Ayari and Hinshelwood take it in turns to drop in and effectively form a back 3 for Brighton with Igor and van Hecke either side. The purpose of this is that if Liverpool wanted to change the OOP roles of MacAllister and Gravenberch and pin them to their respective numbers, it would take a drastic change in The Reds’ shape to the point where it just isn’t feasible for Slot to do so, at least in the current game state.

A variance in this pattern of play is where the goal comes from. In the prior phase, Nunez acted as a lone presser and did really well to stop Brighton from progressing play down their left-hand side (below).

Nunez presses Brighton

van Hecke is forced back to Igor who then sweeps the ball over to the right-back Veltman who in-turn can pass back to van Hecke when he gets back in position (where the build-up tot he goal begins).

Ordinarily, when the 4-2-4 is ‘set’, the middle two in Liverpool’s front line are Nunez (left) and Szoboszlai (right). In this instance, because of Nunez’ aforementioned pressing, he switches the sides that he and Szoboszlai are responsible for (which is fine).

If you look at the frame below, Hinshelwood has dropped in to make it a back 3, but if you pay attention to Szoboszlai, he makes the wrong judgement to switch back with Nunez so that his #9 can press the ball.

Ayari then, a) sees this happening and b) is smart enough to know an opportunity awaits and so he runs off the back of Szoboszlai to receive the ball on the half turn and get his team going.

Ayari runs off the back of Szoboszlai

Van Hecke obliges Ayari…

Ayari turns with 4 options ahead of him…

On a Macro-level, this passive approach hasn’t resulted in sides creating much by way of xG. The goal itself only has an xG value of 0.05. This style of play though has led to teams enjoying elongated spells of possession in recent weeks. When the scoreboard is on your side, this is something that a lot of us can bear. If there is no need to take risk, then you do not have to.

Nil-Nil is not a scoreline that Liverpool should enjoy. It is also not something they should necessarily fear, and risk being got at at the back whilst chasing their opener. It should however (and was during Jurgen Klopp’s best times) be something The Reds relish to lay waste to – on their own terms.

It did occur to me at the weekend that these players are conditioned for aggression both in and out of possession and the passivity against the ball may be bleeding into the lack of sharpness when Liverpool do get a hold of it. The idea that it’s difficult at the moment for players to turn the intensity up and down at will.

The 2^nd half does not need any graphics. Liverpool go man to man, turn up the heat and Anfield becomes a furnace. The first should come sooner but there was a real assuredness from the players with a confidence that they would get there and one became two in as many minutes.

The player who really sets the tone is Liverpool’s half-time sub.

I’ve noticed when Joe Gomez has come on at both, right back and centre back this season, he has gone touch-tight to the man he is marking and if needed, pushes the forward right the way into their own half when they try and receive a pass.

This has to be an agreement with both the player and his coaches as it wouldn’t occur as consistently as it does, if not.

I can’t see Arne Slot favouring a man-to-man system except for specific games going forward but it should be a jolt in the arm to how dominant Liverpool were in that 2^nd half when the intensity ratcheted up a few notches. He got to see what Anfield is like at it’s frenzied best and a big European night awaits against Xabi Alonso’s stern but beatable Leverkusen.

The Reds can build from a position of strength and I for one cannot wait to see the next evolution.

Take care.